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"JEOPARDY" DURING THE PERIOD OF THE YEAR BOOKS*
MARION S. KIRKi

"I detest the attempt to fetter the law by maxims," said Lord Esher.
"They are almost invariably misleading: they are for the most part so large
and general in their language that they always include something which
really is not intended to be included in them." I Well might these words
apply to the maxim that "a man's life shall not be placed twice in jeopardy
for the same offense". In some form or other this maxim is included in
most of the constitutions of the states of the United States. 2 It is a part of
the common law of England and of the remaining American states. Yet it
is still being interpreted and the body of law on the subject is large and
3
ever-growing.
Blackstone has stated the common law principle governing two trials
for the same offense as follows: "The plea of autrefoits acquit, or a former
acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of
England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than
once for the same offence. And hence it is allowed as a consequence, that
when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other
prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offence,
he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the
same crime." 4 (Italics added.) It is to be noted that the guaranty included in the constitutions of the American states and in the Federal Constitution differs from this statement of Blackstone, first, in that it is broader
and not limited to jeopardy of life, that is, to felony cases, and second, that
it omits the second sentence quoted above, which gives as the basis for a
plea of former acquittal only a verdict of the jury finding a man not guilty.
The most superficial study of American cases must show that the
constitutional guaranty can never be taken literally. Jeopardy, it is said in
*The material for this paper is drawn from a thesis prepared under the direction of
Professor William E. Mikell, Reporter on double jeopardy for the American Law Institute.
tA. B., Bryn Mawr; LL. B., LL. M., Gowen Fellow 1931-1933, University of Pennsylvania; assistant to Professors William E. Mikell and Edwin R. Keedy in the preparation of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the American Law Institute.
'Yarmouth v. France, i Q. B. D. 647, 653 (1887). The Justice was speaking of the
maxim volenti non fit injuria.

2 See COMMENTARIES

ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (Am. Law Inst. 1932)

Tentative Draft No. 2 § 8, at 56.
A recent decision in Pennsylvania has changed the law as to the effect of the attaching
of "jeopardy" in cases less than capital. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 31o Pa. 380, 165 Atl.
This case holds that after jeopardy has attached on a prosecution for a capital
498 (1933).
offense, a discharge of the jury without the defendant's consent and without absolute necessity prevents a second prosecution for murder, but does not prevent a second prosecution for
a lesser offense included in the first indictment.
'BL. CoMMIa. *335(602)
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innumerable cases, attaches when a jury is sworn in a criminal case to try
the prisoner. Accepting this meaning of "jeopardy", then, according to
the literal interpretation of the constitutional guaranty that a man shall not
be twice put in jeopardy, it follows that if a jury is discharged after jeopardy
has attached, no matter how imperative such discharge is, and however
beneficial to the defendant himself, the defendant cannot be put on trial
again for the same offense. No court has ever gone to such lengths in
upholding this interpretation of the guaranty. Countless exceptions are
made and will continue to be made as occasions arise which compel one trial
to be stopped." The judge trying the case may die, one of the jurors may
become insane, the defendant's witnesses may be wrongfully detained by
the prosecution, an earthquake may occur after the jury is sworn,-the
occasions are legion which might interrupt a trial, where, in justice to all,
the defendant ought to be put on trial a second time. It was for this reason
that one court was driven to rule that jeopardy must have been intended to
mean a verdict of a jury; otherwise, as no express exception in case of
necessity was made to the principle in the Constitution it would have to be
a rule without exception. 6 Other American cases have adopted the same
rule. 7 But in a majority of the American states the rule is that where the
jury has been sworn in a criminal case, if it is discharged before rendering
a verdict for a reason not legally sufficient, this is a violation of the common
law principle and the constitutional guaranty against putting a man "twice
in jeopardy" and is "equivalent to an acquittal". 8 The defendant can,
therefore, plead his "former acquittal" in bar of another trial for the same
offense. Some states have even provided for a plea of former jeopardy, in
addition to the plea of former acquittal.9 The English courts, however,
have decided that while there is a rule of practice which requires that a jury
be kept together until it has rendered its verdict, the practice has varied at
different times in English legal history, and has never had any connection
with the principle which allows a plea of a former acquittal or former conviction. Therefore, a discharge of the jury before verdict, even for a reason
which is not legally sufficient, does not operate to bar a second prosecution
of the defendant for the same offense. According to these decisions, the

I See COmmENTARIES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LA-w (Am. Law Inst. 1932)
Tentative Draft No. 2 § 6, at 36.
' See United States v. Haskell, 4 Wash. 402, 410 (C. C. Pa. 1823).
See People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 203 (N. Y. 182o) ; Hoffman v. State, 2o Md. 425
(1863) ; Lovern v. State, I4O Miss. 635, 105 So. 759 (1925) (under the constitution of the
state) ; Smith and Bennett v. State, 41 N. J. L. 598 (1879) ; State v. Van Ness, 82 N. J. L.
181, 83 Atl. 196 (1912) semble. See also United States v. Bigelow, 3 Mack. 393, 421 (D. C.
1884) ; COMMENTARIES ON THE ADMINISTRTION OF CRINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1932)
Tentative Draft No. 2 § 8, at go.
I See COMMENTARIES ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1932)
Tentative Draft No. 2 § 8, at 0I.
9

d. at 96.
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common law plea of autrefoits acquit was based on a verdict of a jury, and
not on the "equivalent of an acquittal". 1"
The guaranty that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense can be interpreted either as a "maxim of law" or as a "statement of law". If the former, its only significance is to embody in a popular
and easily quoted form the set of rules governing the matter of two trials
for the same offense. If interpreted as a statement of law, on the other
hand, it is a rule absolute and subject to no exceptions. Anyone who
attempts to frame in one statement the complete set of rules governing the
matter of two trials for the same offense will realize at once the impossibility of the task. No rule can be formulated prohibiting a second prosecution of the same offense which does not immediately require an exception
or qualification." For this reason it can readily be seen that the guaranty
is in reality nothing more than a maxim, or convenient handle to use in
prohibiting a second trial for the same offense. 12 American courts which
have ruled that "jeopardy" attaches when a jury is sworn and that a discharge of the jury before verdict prevents a second trial for the same offense,
have fallen into the error of regarding the constitutional guaranty and the
common law principle as a "statement of law" to be applied literally, rather
than as a maxim of law expressing a great general principle. Nevertheless,
when occasions arise where the discharge of a jury is imperative and in
the interest of justice, they uniformly hold that this "statement of law" is
not without exceptions.
The purpose of this article is to show the early history of the term
"jeopardy" and the origin and interpretation of the maxim that a man's life
shall not be twice "put in jeopardy" for the same offense. In the reports
of the Year Books, which covered the period from approximately 129o to
1535, the word "jeopardy" occurs only eleven times 1- in reports involving
See Reg. v. Charlesworth, I B. & S. 460, 507 (861) and Winsor v. Queen, L. R. i
B. 289, 303, 390 (1866).
See also United States v. Bigelow, supra note 7, at 421. It
is worth noting that in the French criminal procedure of the present day there is no
doctrine of "jeopardy"; it is possible, though apparently rarely done, to discharge a jury and
to postpone the case to another assise and before another jury, even where the reason is that
more information is needed by the prosecution. See 4 GARRAUD, D'INSTRUCMON CRIMIlNELL

Q.

Er DE PROCE-DURE PkNALE (1926) 324.
' For a draft of the rules governing

this matter, see THE ADmINISTRATION OF CPRI1LA-w (Am. L. Inst. 1932) Tentative Draft No. 2, §§ 1-29.
'Coke defines a maxim as a "proposition, to be of all men confessed and granted without proof, argument, or discourse". I INST. *67. In a general way, this is true of the proposition that a man's life shall not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; but as a statement of law it is certainly not true. Broom, in discussing the maxim nwma debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa, says that this "expresses a great fundamental rule of our criminal
law, which forbids that a man should be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence.
It is the foundation of the special pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois conict." But he
states that the maxim can "never be relied upon where the former proceedings were fraudulent and collusive", and he gives other instances where it does not apply. BRoOM, LEGAL
MAXiMS (9th ed. 1924) 230.
' Trin. 9 Hen. V, f. 7, pl. 21 (1421) ; Hil. 21 Hen. VI, f. 28, pl. 12 (1443) ; Hil. 33 Hen.
VI, ,f. I, pl. 6 (1455) ; Mich. 34 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. 19 (455) ; Hil. 8 Ed. IV, ff. 24, 25, pl. 7
n¢i.
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criminal cases, 14 and in only three of these instances 1-was it used in the
statement that a man's life shall not be twice "put in jeopardy" for the same
offense. In other words, it will be shown that, although the word "jeopardy"
began early to have some legal significance, it was not originally connected
with the maxim that a man's life cannot twice be jeopardized for the same
offense.
Under the criminal procedure of the period of the Year Books, a body
of rules grew up prescribing when a second trial for the same offense was
allowed and when prohibited. There was a principle of res judicata which
prevented two prosecutions under certain circumstances, although those
words were never used in the Year Book reports. But it was not a correct
statement of law as it existed at that period to say that a man's life could
not be put "twice in jeopardy" for the same offense. This was true whether
the "putting in jeopardy" occurred when the jury was sworn or even after
an acquittal or conviction. During this period a man might legally be put
"tvice in jeopardy" of his life because of the dual system of prosecution, by
indictment and by appeal. This dual system of prosecution continued in
England until 1819,10 though the appeal became obsolete long before this
time. Prosecution by appeal was the older method and during the period
of the Year Books was commonly used in cases of treason, homicide, robbery, larceny, rape and mayhem. 1 7 The party to whom the "suit of
vengeance", as it was called, was allowed 18 first took out a writ of appeal
and thereafter framed a charge against the defendant, or appellee. An
indictment for the same offense could also be brought, but the appeal was
deemed to have priority 19 during the period within which an appeal might
(1469); Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. ii, pl. 6 (1477) ; Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. II, pl. 7 (1477) ; Mich. 21
Ed. IV, ff.73, 74, pl. 57 (481)
(the word is obviously used in its popular meaning here) ;
Trin. 22 Ed. IV, f. 19, pl. 46 (1482) ; Hil. 9 Hen. VII, f. 19, pl. 14 (1494) ; Mich. 2o Hen.
VII, f. II, pl. 21 (1504) (the word seems to be used in the popular sense here). The adjective "jeopardus" appears in the following cases, apparently having only the popular meaning: P. 4 Ed. IV, f. 1o, pl. 14 (1464) and 4 Ed. IV, f. iI,,pl. 18 (1464).
" Several of these cases were civil actions of conspiracy, but as will be shown later,
these were based on the fact that criminal prosecutions had previously been brought maliciously against the plaintiff.
'Hil. 21 Hen. VI, f. 28, pl. 12 (1443) ; Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. ii, pl. 6 (1477) ; Hil. 9 Hen.
VIi, f. 19, pl. 14 (1494). Three civil cases were found in which the term "jeopardy" was
found, and undoubtedly more could be uncovered on research. P. ii Hen. IV, ,f.
65, pl. 25
(1410) ; Mich. 2 Rich. III, ff.14, 15, pl. 39 (1484) ; and P. 5 Hen. VII, f. 18, pl. ii (1490).
In the last case cited, it is said that because of the "jeopardy of doubt" whether the law is as
stated by counsel for the other side the plea should be decided in favor of the one entering
the plea. This shows the older meaning of "jeopardy" as "even chance". See NEW ENGLISH
DicIoNARY tit. Jeopardy.
" The criminal appeal was abolished by the statute 59 GEo. III, c. 46 (1819).
172 HAWilNS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1788) c. 23, §§ 15, 29 et seq. Appeals of
treason and arson early became obsolete. Id. at §§ 29, 73.
"See ibid. for the rules prescribing who had the right to sue an appeal in any given case.
" 17 Seld. Soc., I & 2 Ed. II, 42 (1308-9) ; 4o Ass. f. 261, pl. 18; Mich. ii Hen. IV, f.
94, pl. 56 (1410) ; Hil. 8 Hen. V, f. 6, pl. 26 (1421). In one case the appeal of an infant
was abated since an infant could not sue during his nonage. He asked to have the venire
facias to sue for the king, but this was denied. The suit of the king must wait on the mere
chance that another, having the right to appeal, might sue within the year. 4o Ass. f. 254,
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be brought,-that is, in general, a year and a day. 20 If an appeal, properly
framed and brought by the proper person, was abandoned, it became possible for the prosecution to continue on the appeal "at the suit of the king".
The king, in other words, stepped into the position of the party to whom the
suit rightfully belonged, and the prosecution was uninterrupted. If, however, an appeal was quashed because the charge was not properly framed or
because the wrong person sued, it was not possible for the prosecution to
continue on the appeal. 21 In such event, the suit of the king had to be by
indictment.
Trial of the issue on an appeal prosecuted by the party injured could
be by battle or by jury. Whenever the prosecution was at the suit of the
22
king, however, whether on appeal or on indictment, trial had to be by jury.
As the great majority of cases of appeal were tried by a jury, 23 there was
pl. 14. Later, however, the rules were relaxed which prevented a suit of the king being
brought during the period within which an appeal might be brought, and the statute 3 HEN.
VII, c. 1 (1487) established this practice as law.
' Originally the appellor had to show that he had made fresh suit in prosecuting his appeal. The Statute of Gloucester, 6 ED. I, c. 9 (1278), provided that an appeal should not "be
abated for default of fresh suit if the party shall sue within the year and the day after the
deed done". The Statute seems to refer only to appeals of homicide. The words quoted,

however, were considered in one case as applying to robbery.

FITZHmERT, ABRIDGEMENT

tit. Corone, 184. A later case held that a man must show fresh suit on an appeal of robbery,
and even though the appeal was not commenced within the year, if fresh suit were proved,
the appeal was good. P. 7 Hen. IV, 1. 43, pl. 9 (14o6). There seems, therefore, to be doubt
as to the time within which an appeal must be brought except'as to appeals of death. See
STAUNDFORDE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN

(1583)

62 and 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN

(6th

ed. 1788) c. 23, § 33 (appeal of death), § 48 (appeal of larceny), § 72 (appeal of rape).
There is also a difference of opinion as to the method of measuring the statutory period for
an appeal of death. Staundforde considers it should be brought within a year and a day
after the stroke given. STAUNDFORDE, supra at 63. But Hale denies this, saying that it is a
year and day after the date of the death. I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1847) 427.
- "If the appeal was once good, and well taken and founded on true and substantial matter, and is thereafter abated by act of God or act of the party or by law, the felony being
found, the king for his interest shall put the party to answer such appeal abated." STAUNDFORDE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 148a. "But if it be pleaded on the appeal that the plaintiff is
outlawed, or a man attainted or otherwise disabled from having an appeal . . . or that the
appeal was not commenced within the year and day, or that the plaintiff had an older brother
living to whom the appeal is given . . . all such matters which would have barred the
plaintiff shall bar also the King from taking advantage of the appeal." Id. at 149.
" "Rex non pugnat, nec aliuin habet campionem quam patriam." 2 BRACrON, DE LEGIBUS
ANGLIAB f. i42b. Originally the defendant on an appeal had to be tried by battle, but in the
course of the thirteenth century the privilege was extended to him of choosing his mode of
trial on an appeal. MAITLAND, PLEAS OF THE CROWN FOR THE COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER
(1884) xxxvi et seq.
" "Rare are the examples of battels waged upon criminals in the annals of the English
laws," said Selden in 1640, "and (if I forget not) the least plural number doubled, comprehends as many as are therein reported with ensuing performance." THE DUELLO OR SINGLE
CoIBAT c. viii. Only four cases were found by the writer in the Year Book reports
wherein the trial by battle took place, although more cases showed that the defendant offered
to prove "by his body". These four cases were: Hil. 6 Ed. III, f. 12, pl. 29 (1332) ; P. 2S
Ed. III, f. 85, pl. 31 (1350) ; Trin. 47 Ed. III, f. s, pl. IO (1372) ; and Mich. ig Hen. VI,
.f. 35, pI. 74 (1440). The first case cited is also found, practically verbatim in the report of
Trin. ii Hen. IV, f. 93, pl. 50 (1410). In P. 21 Hen. VI, f. 34, pl. I (1443), the reporter
attributes it to H. 7 Ed. IV, but this is obviously incorrect. The case must be from the reign
of Edward the Third, since Herle, Chief Justice of the Common Bench during that reign, is
named as deciding the case.
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little difference in the procedure once the prosecution started. Conviction,
in cases which could be prosecuted either by appeal or indictment, carried
24
the sentence of death.

From this short summary of criminal prosecution during the period
of the Year Books it is plain that courts were called upon frequently to
decide whether a second prosecution for the same offense was permissible.
For example, what was the effect of an acquittal or conviction on an appeal
of the party as a bar to a prosecution by indictment? 25 What was the
effect of an acquittal or conviction on an indictment as a bar to a prosecution by appeal of the party? 26 What was the effect of an acquittal or conviction at the suit of the king on an appeal as a bar to an indictment? 27
What was the effect of an acquittal or conviction on an indictment as a bar
to a prosecution at the suit of the king on an appeal ? 28 From early times
it appears that an acquittal or conviction on a prosecution at the suit of one
party operated generally to bar that party from a second prosecution of the
same offense. 29 But the rules became more involved where the two prosecu'If the defendant on the trial by battle defended himself until the stars appeared (BRAcop. cit. supra note 22, at f. 142) or, as Selden thinks, until sunset (op. cit. supra note
23, at c. xi) he was acquitted. But if he was conquered in battle, judgment was that he be
hanged. Coke says: "If the defendant in appeal be vanquished in the field, the record reciteth
the vanquishing in the field. Ideo consideratun est, quod sits. per col. and so it is when the
defendant is vanquished and slain in the field, yet the judgment is ut supra. Otherwise there
should be no escheat." 3 INST. *212.
'An acquittal on an appeal after a trial by jury was a bar to a prosecution for the
same offense by indictment. P. 9 Hen. V, f. 2, pl. 7 (1421); Mich. 34 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. ig
(455) ; Mich. 14 Hen. VII, f. 2, pl. 8 (1498). There is some doubt whether an acquittal
after a trial by battle was a bar to a prosecution by indictment. Fitzherbert cites a case to
show it was not a bar. ABRIDGEMENT tit. Corone, 375, citing H. 12 Ed. II. Staundforde
repeats this statement from Fitzherbert and says: "The reason seems to be that trial by battle
does not lie against the king; wherefore there is no reason why he shall be bound by such
trial." STAUNDFORDE, op. cit. supra note 2o, at io6a; but he doubts the correctness of the
rule. No instance was found by the writer where an acquittal on an appeal was followed by
a prosecution by indictment for the same offense. After conviction on an appeal there could
be no second prosecution by indictment, since such conviction carried the sentence of death,
and if the defendant was pardoned this would operate to prevent a prosecution at the suit of
the king.
L Before the Statute of 1487, 3 H. VII, c. I, an acquittal on an indictment was held to
bar a prosecution at the suit of the party for the same offense. Trin. 21 Ed. III, f. 23, pl.
16 (1346) ; 21 Ass. f. 76, pl. 4; Mich. 44 Ed. III, f. 38, pl. 35 (1369) ; Trin. 45 Ed. III, f.
25, pl. 36 (1370) ; Hil. 7 Hen. IV, f. 35, pl. 4 (1406) ; Mich. 31 Hen. VI, f. ii, pl. 6 (1452) ;
Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. ii, pl. 6 (1477). There is a suggestion, however, that the law on this
point was different in earlier cases. See 24 Seld. Soc., Eyre o~f Kent, 85, 125 (1313) ; Hil. 17
Ed. III, f. 2, pl. 6 (1343) ; 17 Ass. f. 48, pl. I (1343). After the Statute of 1487 neither a
conviction nor an acquittal on an indictment was a bar to a prosecution for the same offense
by appeal, if the appeal was brought within the year.
- It seems that the second prosecution was barred. P. 4 Ed. IV, f. 10, pl. 14 (1464).
An early case held that an indictment brought within the year was a nullity and not a
bar to a prosecution by appeal, even the prosecution continued at the suit of the king. 24 Seld.
Soc., Eyre of Kent, 85 (1313). A little later, however, we find a plea of a former acquittal
under such circumstances upheld. 14 Ed. III (R. S.) 154 (61) (1340). See also Hil. 21
Hen. VI, f. 28, pl. 12 (I443), and BRooxE, ABRIDGEMENT tit. Appeal 41.
1 One indictment was a bar to a second. 24 Seld. Soc., Eyre of Kent, 73 (1313) ; id. at
127; Trin. 25 Ed. III, f. 87, pl. 6 (1350) ; 41 Ass. f. 253, pl. 9. One appeal was bar to another by the same party. 24 Seld. Soc., Eyre of Kent, 125 (1313) semble; 47 Ass. f. 311,
pl. 7. For the exception see supra note 28.
TON,
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tions for the same offense were instituted by different parties, that is, when
one prosecution was an appeal of the party and the other was the suit of
the king. Before the year 1487, an acquittal on an indictment was held to
be a bar to an appeal of the party for the same offense." ° But a conviction,
followed by a pardon, was not a bar, for the pardon invariably was on the
condition that the defendant "stand to right" (stet recto) to answer the suit
of the party." In the year 1487, a statute was passed 32 which provided
that an indictment in homicide cases could be brought within the year
allowed by law for the bringing of an appeal, and an acquittal or conviction
on such indictment should not operate as a bar to an appeal by the proper
party, if brought within the year.
It is apparent, therefore, that although there were rules of law which
prescribed when a second prosecution for the same offense was barred, it
was not a correct statement of law to say that, during this period of the
Year Books and, in fact, until the abolition of the appeal in 18i9,23 a man's

life was never to be put "twice in jeopardy" for the same offense. In the
time of Queen Anne, a man was acquitted, against *the evidence, on an
indictment of murder. Chief Justice Holt ordered an appeal to be brought
against him for the same offense. On this appeal he was convicted by a
jury, and sentenced to death.3 1 In another case in the same reign, a defendant was convicted on an indictment of murder and pardoned. He was then
appealed for the same offense, convicted of manslaughter and again pardoned.3 5 In 1818, when prosecution on appeal had become well-nigh for' See supra note 26.
3130-3I Ed. I (R. S.) 504, 514; 24 Seld. Soc., Eyre of Kent, 77 (1313). Maitland has
said of this situation: "The King could not protect the man-slayer from the suit of the dead
man's kin. Even when the pardon was granted on the score of misadventure, this suit was
saved by express words." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed.
1911) 482. But he seems to think that at least in the time of Henry the Third, although the
suit of the party was saved, there was a way of avoiding execution of the judgment. He recounts how Mr. Justice Thurkelby was consulted by a friend who had obtained a pardon but
was being appealed. "The advice that the expert lawyer gave was this :-You had better go to
battle; but directly a blow is struck cry 'Craven' and produce your charter; you will not be
punished, for the King has given you your life and members." (Citing LA CORONA PLEDfE
Id. at 483. It may be that the parDEVANT JUSTICE: Camb. Univ. Libr. Mm. i. 27, f. 124.)
ticular ,form of pardon in the case presented to the Justice afforded him reason for giving his
advice; it may be that it was possible in the time of Henry III for the king to pardon the
execution of the sentence at the suit of the party; or it may even be that this expert advice,
as has sometimes since then been the case, did not represent the true state of the law. It is
certain, however, that according to the Year Books the King's pardon did not pardon either
the suit of the party or the execution of sentence at the party's suit. "As the party had
judgment on him", said Justice Huls, "the King cannot pardon him; wherefore if you do not
allege a release or such matter by which the party shall be ousted of execution you shall
• . . be put to execution." Mich. ii Hen. IV, f. 16, pl. 36 (1409). The same was true
where a man was outlawed at the suit of the king and at the suit of the party for the same
offense; if the defendant did not show an agreement by the party to pardon the outlawry,
the pardon of the king was of no avail. 42 Ass. f. 26o, pl. 15.
=3 HEN. VII, c. i (1487).
=59 GEo. III, c. 46 (i8ig).
Young v. Slaughterford, Queen Anne's Cases 217, 228 (1709).
= Smith v. Bowen, Queen Anne's Cases 216, 230, 254 (1709). Another case is cited in
I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883)

345.

"JEOPARDY" DURING THE PERIOD OF THE YEAR BOOKS

gotten, one Thornton was charged on indictment with the murder of one
Mary Ashford, and was acquitted by a jury. The brother of the dead girl
then appealed Thornton of the same offense. 36 By this time the maxim
that a man's life ought not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense
was so well intrenched in English law that the trial aroused much criticism,
and in the following year a statute was passed abolishing the criminal appeal
37
and, in consequence, trial by battle.
It having been shown that a man could be tried a second time for the
same offense, even after an acquittal or conviction, it now remains to be
seen what was the legal significance of the term "jeopardy" as used in the
Year Books and at what point in the prosecution of a case such jeopardy
attached.
The rule that an improper discharge of the jury operates as an acquittal of the defendant on the charge, and is a bar to a second prosecution
for the same offense, is commonly based on two statements of Coke and on
a case found in the Year Books. Coke says in one place, "A jury, sworn or
charged in case of life or member cannot be discharged by the court or any
other, but they ought to give a verdict." 3 And in another place, "To speak
it here once for all, if any person be indicted of treason, or of felony, or
larceny, and plead not guilty, and thereupon a jury is retorned, and sworn,
their verdict must be heard, and they cannot be discharged." 39 There is
also a statement from a Year Book report concerning the necessity of keeping the jurors together until they have agreed. It is to be noted that Coke,
although he stated the necessity of keeping jurors together in capital cases,
did not mention the effect of a failure to follow that procedure. The Year
Book case 40 containing the statement requiring jurors to be kept together
until they reached a verdict was not a criminal but a civil suit, before justices on assize. Eleven of the jurors agreed on the verdict, but the twelfth
refused to agree and was sent to prison, the justices accepting the verdict
of the eleven. The Justices of the Common Bench, however, held this procedure improper. The panel was quashed, the juror discharged from prison
I Ashford v. Thornton, I B. & Aid. 405 (Eng. 1818). It is to be noticed that the defendant could not plead autrefoits acquit because of the Statute of 1487. Thornton elected to
be tried on the appeal by battle, instead of by a jury. Evidently Ashford did not expect such
a method of trial. He argued that the defendant was "ousted of battle" because the presumption of guilt was strong against him. The court ruled against the appellor's plea and
allowed battle. The appellor, Ashford, thereupon discontinued the appeal, and the defendant
was immediately arraigned on the appeal at the suit of the king. Now for the first time
Thornton could plead his former acquittal at the suit of the king by indictment. He was
thereupon discharged from the prosecution.
'"

Supra note 33.

M I INST. 4 227b.
W 3 Id. "11o.

041 Ass. f. 253, pl. Ii. This case is also cited by FITZHERBER, ABiDGzMENT tit. Verdict, 43, and by BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT tit. Jurors, 29, Enquest, 65, and Verdict, 49. It may
have been the frequent repetition of the case by Brooke and Fitzherbert which established
the general belief in such a practice.
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and the plaintiff made to sue a new venire facias for an assize, that is, for
another jury to try his case. The justices are reported to have said, "They
ought to have carried the jurors about in carts until they were agreed." It
is to be noted that although it was held improper to discharge the jurors
before they had rendered their verdict, yet a second trial of the action
actually took place. From the statement that the jurors should have been
carried about in carts until they agreed, there has grown up a general belief
that this was the practice in such a situation. It has been seriously questioned, however, whether this was ever in fact the practice in England.4 1
In another report of the same case nothing is said about carrying the twelve
in carts until they agree.42 The case, therefore, offers no support for the
proposition that an improper discharge of the jury in a criminal case before
rendering a verdict is a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense.
There is evidence, on the other hand, that it was proper to discharge a
jury after it had been sworn, and to begin the case again. It has been said
of the cases tried at the Eyre of Kent in 1313 that the record shows "that
cases were adjourned once or twice, or even oftener for further evidence.
Perhaps one might even go so far as to say that they were revived, when
some forgotten evidence was recovered or remembered." 43 Maitland, who
makes this statement, may have warrant for it from his study of the
records; his illustration, however, shows that a presenting jury first charged
two persons with the death of another; later they added a third person to
the list of the accused. It is impossible to determine from this what were
the actual proceedings at the trial of each separate defendant and whether
any interruption was permitted "for further evidence", as he says. One
case from the reports of the Year Books, however, does show that jurors
were sworn on an indictment of felony, and when it was found that the roll
containing an entry of the indictment was not ready in court, the jurors
were suffered to go at large and the next day "they were later sworn anew
44
as if they had never appeared before ".

The most positive evidence that it was possible, during the later Year
Book period at least, to discharge a jury for certain causes after it had been
sworn comes from a dialogue in Doctor and Student, which was published
shortly after the close of the Year Book period. In this dialogue the student
asks what procedure would be followed if one of the jurors knows the
truth and refuses to be swayed by the other eleven jurors to give a verdict
contrary to his conscience. Shall he, because food and drink are not
allowed to jurors until they are agreed, be forced "to be eyther forsworne,
or to be famished and die for lacke of meat?" The doctor answers that if
note IO,at 498 n. (b).
" Reg. v. Charlesworth, supra
1
" Mich. 41 Ed. III, f. 31, p . 36 (1367).

24 Seld. Soc., Eyre of Kent
xlvi.
"*Hil. 7 Hen. IV, f. 39, p1. 2(19o9)
(14o6); FiTznEnExr,
BROoxE, ABRIDGMENT tit. Jurors, 6.
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"that appereth to the Justices by examinacion, the Justices maye in that
case suffre them have bothe meate and drynke for a tyme to se whether they
wyll agree, and if they wyll in no wyse agree I thinke that than the Justices
may set such order in ye matter as shal seine to them by their discrecion to
stand with reason and conscience by awardinge of a new enquest and by
setting fines upon them that they shall find in defaute or otherwise as they
shall thinke best by theyr discrecyon like as they may do if one of the Juri
dye before verdit, or if any other lyke casualties fall in. that behalfe." 45
(Italics added.) Brooke, writing in 156o, also has a note to the effect that
if one of the jurors dies before the verdict, a new inquest will be ordered.4 6
No case has been found in the reports of the Year Books in which it
was pleaded in bar of a second prosecution that the accused had been prosecuted before for the same offense and the jury was discharged before rendering a verdict. From the evidence of these early reports, it would seem
to be true, as was said much later, that the matter of keeping the jury
together until they had rendered their verdict was "not considered a rule
by the
of positive law, but of practice and procedure, subject to variation
47
practice".
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Although, as was said above, the attaching of jeopardy did not bar a
second prosecution, it does appear that it had some legal effect. The evidence is, moreover, that jeopardy attached not when the jury was sworn to
try the case, but at an earlier stage in the proceedings, namely, when a plea
of not guilty was entered. This is gleaned from a number of statements
of counsel and finally by the expressed opinion of a Justice of the King's
Bench. In the first of these cases 48 the statement of counsel for the defendant, which was not refuted by the court, was that "jeopardy" had
already attached when the jury had come, was sworn and was ready to pass
on the case. The reporter of another case 41 states that "it was touched in
this case" that jeopardy had not attached during the argument on a special
plea. In a third report, 50 where the appellee, that is, the defendant on an
appeal, had pleaded not guilty, and before the jurors had appeared, it was
stated that jeopardy had attached. Finally in the fourth case, 51 we have
Justice Fairfax stating, "The defendant has pleaded a plea (not guilty) by
which he has put his life in jeopardy." 52

" DOCTOR AND

STUDENT (1554) Dial. 2, C. 52.
tit. Jurors, 51.
' Reg. v. Charlesworth, supra note 10, at 500.
'Trin. 9 Hen. V, f. 7, pl. 21 (1421).
19Hil. 8 Ed. IV, f. 24, pl. 7 (1469), citing from a case in 3 Hen. VI.
"'ABRIDGEMENT

r9Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. II, pl. 7 (1477).
" Trin. 22 Ed. IV, f. 19, pl. 46 (482).
'The word "jeopardy" seems to have come into usage in the English language during
the I4th and 15th centuries. See Nmv ENGLISH DICTIONARY. An early case in 1344 expresses the idea of the attaching of "jeopardy" when there is a plea, but the word "peryl" is
used instead of "jeopardy". It was pleaded that there was another case of trespass for the
same offense pending, on which defendant had pleaded to issue. "Wherefore", said the defend-
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It would seem that if the attaching of jeopardy is to have legal significance, it is more logical to hold that it occurs when a plea of not guilty is
entered rather than when the jury is sworn. In the popular sense of the
term, a man may be said to be in "jeopardy" of conviction at any stage of
the prosecution from arrest to the final review of the case by an appellate
court. Although American courts say that a man is in legal jeopardy when
a jury is sworn to try his case, yet it is undoubtedly true that a defendant
could not legally be convicted unless there has been a valid indictment in a
competent court, a plea (or waiver thereof), and, if the plea is "not guilty",
a jury sworn and a prima facie case made out; for until these things have
happened no valid judgment of conviction could be entered against him.
Therefore, the accused ought not to be deemed to be in legal jeopardy until
sufficient evidence has been introduced against him upon a valid indictment
and in a competent court to warrant a verdict of conviction. No American
court fixes this point in the trial as the time when jeopardy attaches. In
modern English law the defendant is not in jeopardy even at this pointnot until there has been a verdict of acquittal or conviction.5 3 As between
the modern American rule and the ruling of Fairfax, J., it seems more
logical to hold that jeopardy attaches at the earlier time, namely, when the
defendant pleads not guilty, rather than when the jury is sworn. Before
the plea of not guilty is made, a verdict of conviction would be a nullity;
the statement from the Year Book report is true that the defendant's life
was not in jeopardy during the argument on a special plea, for if this is
ruled against him no judgment of conviction can be entered; he can still
plead over to the felony. 5 4 After he pleads not guilty, however, the defendant is to this extent in jeopardy in that for the first time he is in a
position where a valid judgment of guilty can be entered against him. The
only argument for holding that jeopardy attaches at the time the jury is
sworn is the rule of practice which compelled a jury once sworn in the trial
of a case to be kept together until it rendered a verdict. That, as has been
stated above, was a rule of practice, growing probably out of the exigencies
of early times when jurors of the counties where the facts occurred were
summoned to give testimony at Westminster on a trial based on those facts."
It seems not to have been an invariable rule and has never been found to
have had any connection, in the cases at English common law, with the
problem of two trials for the same offense.
ant, "if you were to be answered in this Court, then, should 'you recover in this Court, we
should never be admitted to allege the fact afterwards in the other Court; and so it would
follow that we should be twice charged, because we have at our peril [peryl] pleaded to
issue." (Italics added.) 18 Ed. III (R. S.) 364 (3i) (1344).
Reg. v. Charlesworth; Winsor v. Queen, both .nqpra note Io.
STAUNDFORDE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 98a: "In favorem vitae, the law permits him to
plead over to the felony." See also Trin. 14 Ed. IV, ,f. 7, pl. 9 (474).
But this same report
says, "If he demurs on a plea which is adjudged against him, he shall be hanged. Which
was conceded."
W43 Seld. Soc. (1926) xiii.
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Although there is nowhere any intimation in the reports of the Year
Books that the attaching of jeopardy had any effect in barring a second
prosecution for the same offense, it does appear that upon the entry of a
plea of not guilty some consequences ensued. The word "jeopardy" appears in the reports of the Year Books for the first time in 1421.56 Before
this date, it was stated in one case " that if a man pleaded not guilty he
could not thereafter become an approver 5 S and appeal others, since he had
"joined a binding (peremptoire) issue". After a plea of not guilty it was
too late to change to a plea of a former acquittal, according to another early
case."0 Also, after a plea of not guilty on an indictment it was too late to
ask that the trial be postponed on the ground that there was an appeal pending for the same offense.60 The reporter of another case was of opinion
that when "jeopardy" had attached on an appeal the appellor could not
appeal again for the same offense while the first appeal was pending.61 This
is the only case in which it is suggested that after jeopardy attached a second
prosecution of the same defendant was barred.
Another effect of the attaching of jeopardy was stated in another case.6"
An appeal of robbery had been brought and the defendant pleaded not
guilty and demanded a trial by battle. The plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ousted of battle since there was an indictment pending against him
for the same robbery. Justice Fairfax had the indictment read, but, as it
was not sufficient in form, he held it could not oust the defendant of his
right to trial by battle. Then counsel for the appellor said, "We pray that
we can imparl" (that is, adjourn to consider a new line of argument).
Justice Fairfax answered: "That would be against reason, for the defendant
has pleaded a plea by which he has put his life in jeopardy; wherefore there
is reason that the plaintiff reply or otherwise he (the Justice) will dismiss
the defendant from court."
Three cases show that the attaching of jeopardy on a criminal prosecution was necessary to sustain an action for damages for conspiracy to
procure an indictment for a felony, or for a malicious appeal. By the
Statute of Westminster 63 it was provided that if a person were acquitted
modo debito of a charge of felony on an appeal, either at the suit of the
party or at the suit of the king, damages for a malicious appeal could be
' Trin. 9 Hen. V, ,f. 7, pl. 21 (1421).
'7Trin. 21 Ed. III, f. 18, pl. 25 (1346).
'An approver was a person who confessed his guilt on a prosecution by indictment and
appealed others of the same offense. 2 Hen. VIi, f. 3, pl. 8 (1486) ; FITzHERERT, ABRIDGElENT tit. Corone, 50.
Go30-31 Ed. I (R. S.) 537.
'Mich. 31 Hen. VI, f. ii, pl. 6 (1452); FrrZHERBERT, ABRIDGEMENT tit. Corone, is.
An additional reason may have been in this case that the jurors were in court ready to be
Sworn.
"Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. 11, pl. 7 (1477).
Trin. 22 Ed. IV, f. 19, pl. 46 (1482).
"WEsatINSER II (13 Edw. I) c. 12 (1285).
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assessed both against the appellor and against his abettors. There was
also a common law action of conspiracy against persons who maliciously
procured another to be indicted for felony. 64

In each of these situations

it was necessary, inter alia, to show that the person who had been subjected
to a malicious appeal or false indictment had been acquitted inodo debito, or,
as the cases generally put it, "legitimo modo acquietatus". A discharge of
the defendant because of an abatement of the appeal, 65 or a demurrer 66 or
because the defendant took to his clergy 67 was not such an acquittal. But
if he was acquitted after "the life of the defendant was in jeopardy" he was
legitimo modo acquietatus. This appears in three reports. In two the same
set of facts appear, and the two reports seem to be different stages of the
same case.6 A principal and an accessory were accused of an offense on
the same indictment. The principal was tried first and acquitted by a jury,
and this acquittal operated to discharge the accessory, since an accessory
could not be tried unless the principal felon was attainted. The accessory
thereafter sued a writ of conspiracy against the persons who procured the
indictment and claimed that he had been legitimo modo acquietatus. It was
objected by the defendants that the plaintiff could not have this action of
conspiracy because the principal in the former charge had been acquitted
and therefore "the life of the accessory was never in jeopardy". But the
court ruled that the accessory had an action of conspiracy when he with the
principal was charged on the same indictment and the principal was acquitted, "for the life of the accessory was in jeopardy by one and the same
thing". This case was later decided against the plaintiff on the ground
that the writ failed to mention certain matters. In the next year, however,
the plaintiff seems to have amended his complaint, for the same case is
continued with the same arguments advanced regarding jeopardy. Littleton '9 seems to have agreed that the accessory's life was not in jeopardy by
the trial of the principal, but, he said, since he had been legitino modo
acquietatus,he could sue this writ under the statute. Justice Danby, on the
other hand, upheld the action because "in this case his life was in jeopardy
by one and the same thing. For if the principal were attainted then those
of the enquest ought to inquire if the accessory was guilty or not, if he had
appeared."
In another case 70 the plaintiff sued a writ of conspiracy against certain
defendants charging that they caused him to be indicted for the death of
Co. IxsT. *562. See also POLLOCK AND MAIMrAND, op. cit. supra note 31, at 539.
op. Cit. supra note 20, at 16q, citing FITZHERBERT,-ABRIDGEMENT tit.
Corone, 2O1; 27 Ass. 77 and T. 9 Hen. IV.
Ibid., citing M. 21 Hen. VI.
Ibid., citing P. 17 Ed. II.
Hil. 33 Hen. VI, f. i, pl. 6 (1455) ; Mich. 34 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. 19 (1455).
'This is probably the famous Littleton who was afterwards, in 1467, appointed Justice
of the Common Bench. See Co. LrrT. (ist Am. ed. 1853) XXIX.
I Hil. 21 Hen. VI, f. 28, pl. 12 (1443).
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J. Paiton and that he had been arraigned at the suit of the king and legitimo
modo acquietatus. For the defendants it was argued that the plaintiff had
not been legitimo modo acquietatus because there was an appeal pending
against him for the same offense brought by the wife of J. Paiton, which
should have had precedence, and therefore the trial on the indictment was
a nullity. Justice Newton held that the trial on the indictment was not a
nullity. "If one be arraigned on an indictment within the year," he said,
"this arraignment is lawful, and if he be acquitted, he shall not be arraigned
at the suit of the wife or heir, for then he would put his life twice in
jeopardy, and rather shall the wife or the heir lose their action, et hoc in
favorem vitae." Justice Ascue disagreed with the statement of Justice
Newton that a man's life could not be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense. For, he argued, if a younger son brings an appeal, or a person
claiming as heir where there is a wife living, and the defendant makes no
objection, an acquittal on such a trial shall not be a bar to a prosecution at
the suit of the older son in the one case, or the wife in the other. "So in
several cases," he says, "a man shall put his life twice in jeopardy." The
case shows that the Justices finally agreed that the first trial was not a
nullity. It is clear from this difference of opinion as to the statement made
by Justice Newton that the maxim was not an accepted principle in 1443.
As a term having some bearing on the question of two trials for the
same offense the word "jeopardy" is to be found in two later cases during
the Year Book period. In neither of these cases was there any expression
of opinion by the Justices and in both it is doubtful whether the maxim was
stated at the time of the prosecution or was added by some later commentator. In a quare impedit action,,' the statement was made by Justice
Brian, "If one brings an appeal of the death of his father, it is a good plea
to say for the defendant that formerly he was indicted, arraigned and acquitted of the same cause, etc. Judgment if action, etc." The report continues as follows: "Quod tota Curia concessit. Et le cause est pur ceo que
le defendant ne mittera sa vie deux foits en jeopardy pur un meme cause."
It would seem that it is not the Justice who has added the reason for the
rule which he stated. His remark ends fittingly with the answer to the plea.
The reporter then adds that the whole court conceded the truth of the Justice's statement. The note in French about jeopardy after the Latin sentence stating the agreement of the court may be either the opinion of the
reporter or an interpolation of a later person, who was using the manuscript
this question
and making annotations. It would be impossible to determine
72
case.
this
reporting
manuscripts
the
without studying
"Hil. I6 Ed. IV, f. ii, pl. 6 (1477).
'The most plausible theory as to the origin of the reports of the Year Books is advanced by William Craddock Bolland, that they were notes of the proceedings as they occurred in court, written on scraps of parchment by junior members of the Bar, probably
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In another report 73 an appeal was brought against one J. as principal
and one Alice as accessory. I. pleaded that formerly he was arraigned of
the same felony and was attainted. "And the plaintiff said that that appeal
was commenced of another matter . . . And on that they were at issue."
The report then continues: "But there see that the said Alice was not put to
answer. For the accessory shall not be put to answer but where the principal is put to answer, and the principal shall not be put to answer for the
same thing twice, for his life shall not two times be put in jeopardy for one
and the same thing." Here again it is impossible to determine from the
text when or by whom the statement as to jeopardy was made.
The only clearly judicial statement, therefore, in the Year Book reports that "a man's life ought not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense" is the statement made by Justice Newton, a statement which was
not necessary for the decision of the case and which was questioned by
Justice Ascue at the time it was made.
That the maxim was not an accepted principle during the period of
the Year Books is borne out by the fact that contemporary writers did not
mention it; and that the word "jeopardy" itself was not an accepted term
can be seen from the fact that each of these same contemporary writers
employed it very rarely. Statham, whose Abridgment of the Law appeared about 1488,'7 4 used the word "jeopardy" only once and then in conThe case which he digests did not, in
nection with a malicious appeal.7
the original, contain the term. Fitzherbert, whose Grande Abridgement
appeared in 1516, used the word "jeopardy" only twice, both times in conBetween the time when Fitzhernection with the action of conspiracy."
156o, when Brooke's Abridgein
1516,
and
Abridgement
appeared,
bert's
ment was published, the word "jeopardy" seems to have become better
known. Eight of the nine Year Book cases where it was employed in a
legal sense are to be found in Brooke's Abridgement,77 and in seven of these
employed by a syndicate of lawyers. These notes were immediately dictated to a number of
scriveners whose reports were, therefore, not original reports but transcripts. No original
reports have ever been found. The Year Books did not begin to be printed until about 1481.
BOLLAND, THE YEAR BooKs (1921) 30-42. On the same subject, see 17 Seld. Soc. (1903)
xi, xc; 26 Seld. Soc. (911) xxiv; 42 Seld. Soc. (1925) xxxix. It is to be noted that if the
last sentence of the report just cited is a later interpolation, it must have been added between
the date of the case, 1477, and 1487, when the law stated by Justice Brian was changed by
statute.
',3Hil. 9 Hen. VII, f. 19, pl. 14 (494).
' See COWLEY, BiBL1oGRAPHY OF ABRIDGMENTS (1932) xxix.
"mSTATHAm, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw tit. Error, 14, a digest of P. 9 Hen. V, f. -,
pl. 7 (1421).
"ABRIDGEMENT tit. Conspiracy, 4, a digest of 33 Hen. VI, f. i, pl. 6 (1455). Fitzherbert calls it "en ieobardie".
"'The eight cases cited by Brooke are as follows: Trin. 9 Hen. V, f. 7, pl. 21 (421);
cited in Challenge, 5o; Hil. 21 Hen. VI, f. 28, pl. 12 (1443), cited in Appeal, 41, and Corone,
48; Hil. 33 Hen. VI,.f. I, pl. 6 (455), and Mich. 34 Hen. VI, f. 9, pl. 19 (455), cited in
Conspiracy, 2; Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. Ii, pl. 6 (1477), cited in Appeal, lO2; Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. ii,
pl. 7 (477), cited in Appeal, lO3; Trin. 22 Ed. IV, f. 19, pl. 46 (482), cited in Continuances and Imparlances, 51; Hil. 9 Hen. VII, f. 19, pl. 14 (i494), cited in Appeal, 89.
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the word jeopardy is used. 7 In addition to these cases Brooke employed
the word in at least four other places. 79 In three of these he states the
principle that "a man's life shall not be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense," although in none of the original cases cited for this principle was
the maxim used. Notwithstanding the fact that Brooke thus states the
principle fh some cases, yet in another place he says: "See where the life of
a man can be twice in jeopardy, as where he is arraigned at the suit of the
younger son and acquitted, or of the heir and acquitted, where there is an
older son in the one case or where the dead man had a wife living in the
other case."

80

It would seem, therefore, that the maxim came to be generally known
between the time of Fitzherbert's Abridgement and the publication of
Brooke's Abridgement. It may be that Brooke himself was interested in
the maxim which he found in the Year Book reports, and developed the
idea in his digest of other cases where it appeared that a second trial for the
same offense was barred. But that he himself was not the originator of
the maxim can be seen from his digest of the cases where it is found in the
Year Books."'
To sum up, three things are to be noted from the reports of the Year
Books. First, the word "jeopardy" acquired a legal meaning in early
times, but it was not originally of significance in connection with the matter
of two trials for the same offense. Second, jeopardy attached, not when
the jury was sworn, but at an earlier period in the prosecution of a case,
namely, when a plea of not guilty was made. Third, it was not a correct
statement of law that a man's life could not be twice "put in jeopardy",
although a complicated set of rules had become formulated prescribing
when a second trial for the same offense was barred.
"1The word "jeopardy" does not appear in Brooke's digest of Trin. 9 Hen. V, f. 7, pl.
21 (1421).
10 ABRIDGEMENT,

tit. Corone, 182: "Note, that no one can take the privilege of the
Church (that is, sanctuary) if he be not in jeopardy of his life." He cites no case for this
statement. The three other instances are Appeal, 9, and Corone, ii, for the digest of Mich.
44 Ed. III, f. 38, pl. 35 (1369) ; Appeal, 12, for the digest of Trin. 21 Ed. III, f. 23, pl. 16
(1346), and Trin. 45 Ed. III, f. 25, pl. 36 (1370) ; and Corone, 49, which is stated to be a
digest of 7 Ed. III [probably Hil. 7 Ed. III, f. 12, pl. 29 (333)1.
°'ABRIDGEMENT tit. Corone, 48, and Appeal, 41.
Cf. Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. ii, pl. 6 (1477), BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT tit. Appeal, 1O2; and
Hil. 16 Ed. IV, f. II, pl. 7 (1477), BROOKE, tit. Appeal, 1O3.

